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Abstract
How much independence should the monetary authority retain in a rules-based
regime? The conventional wisdom holds that while the political system -
particularly in a democratic society - should determine the overarching goal
of monetary policy, the central bank should remain free to select whichever
“levers” it deems most appropriate for achieving the goal. This paper evaluates
whether instrument independence is consistent with the goals of a rules-based
regime by examining the monetary and macroeconomic effects of allowing the
monetary authority discretion over the choice of control procedures when its
objectives are at odds with the public interest. I argue that while a benevolent
monetary authority would always select the most “efficient” policy instrument,
i.e., the instrument consistent with achieving its stated objective, an oppor-
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Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any
system of government, and fixing the several checks and controuls [sic] of
the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have
no other end, in all his actions, than private interest.
- David Hume (1777, 42)
1 Introduction
How much independence should the monetary authority retain in a rules-based
regime? The conventional wisdom holds that while the politically system - partic-
ularly in a democratic society - should determine the overarching goal of monetary
policy, the central bank should remain free to select whichever “levers” it deems most
appropriate for achieving the goal.
There is a potential problem with this view, however, and it relates to the type of
monetary rule adopted and the assumptions made about the authority’s objectives.
Some monetary rules specify the path of a nominal variable - known as target-
ing rules - while others specify the behavior of the monetary authority’s operating
procedures - referred to as instrument rules.1 Under a targeting rule, the monetary
authority typically retains discretion over the policy instruments used to achieve
the specified objective - a principle known as instrument independence.2 This in-
1Examples of the former include inflation and nominal gross domestic product targeting like
those discussed by Bernanke & Mishkin (1997) and Sumner (2014), whereas examples of the lat-
ter include interest rate and monetary base rules, such as those proposed by Taylor (1993) and
McCallum (1989), respectively.
2Note that in this case, the monetary authority may still use an approach like the Taylor Rule
to achieve a legally-mandated target, e.g., 2 percent per year inflation. In this case, however, the
rule refers to the target rather than the instrument since it is the former that has been mandated
by the political system.
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dependence is supposed to insulate the monetary authority from political influence,
thereby avoiding the problems that exist under a discretionary regime (Cukierman,
1994; Fischer, 1995; Fratianni et al., 1997). However, the effectiveness of this ap-
proach depends on the assumptions made about the monetary authority’s objectives.
This paper evaluates whether instrument independence is consistent with the
goals of a rules-based regime by examining the monetary and macroeconomic effects
of allowing the monetary authority discretion over the choice of control procedures
when its objectives are at odds with the public interest. I argue that while a benev-
olent monetary authority would always select the most “efficient” policy instrument,
i.e., the instrument consistent with achieving its stated objective, an opportunistic
one may intentionally choose instruments that obscure its objectives, thereby un-
dermining the purpose of monetary rules. To illustrate this possibility, I draw on
Cukierman and Meltzer’s (1986) model of an opportunistic monetary authority and
Poole’s (1970) analysis of policy instruments to determine whether a targeting rule
with instrument independence is sufficient to insulate monetary policy from political
influence.
The debate over targeting versus instrument rules has focused on identifying rules
that minimize a social loss function rather than on which type better constrains the
monetary authority (Froyen & Guender, 2012; McCallum & Nelson, 2005; Svensson,
2003, 2005). While setting aside political considerations has the benefit of providing
analytical clarity when comparing the technical operation of alternative institutional
arrangements, doing so can lead to misleading conclusions about how a particular
monetary rule will work in practice. This paper differs in that it relaxes the assump-
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tion that the monetary authority’s objective is to minimize a social loss function.
My analysis contributes to this debate by demonstrating that under a targeting rule
the monetary authority may still enjoy considerable discretion that it can exploit for
political purposes if its objectives are less than fully benevolent, which points to the
need to consider seriously the extent to which targeting rules are robust to different
assumptions about the monetary authority’s objectives.3
This article also contributes to the literature on the political economy of mone-
tary rules and institutions that has emerged in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.
This literature has stressed the epistemic limitations that monetary policymakers
face (Salter & Smith, 2017), the institutional pressures that influence monetary pol-
icymakers’ decisions (Salter & Smith, 2019; Salter & Luther, 2019), the role that
politics plays in shaping monetary policy (Binder & Spindel, 2017; Conti-Brown,
2016; Smith & Boettke, 2015; Meltzer, 2011), and the need to adopt a rules-based
framework that establishes monetary policy as one of the “rules of the game” (Boet-
tke et al., 2018; Buchanan, 2010; Hetzel, 2012; Salter, 2014; White et al., 2015).
The analysis in this paper builds on these studies by highlighting the importance
of thinking about the potential margins of adjustments that can be exploited when
monetary rules are under-specified.
Finally, this paper complements earlier work on monetary policy games such as
Backus & Driffill (1985), who examine a setting where the public are uncertain about
3The notion of robust used in this paper differs from that found in the monetary literature,
which typically refers to how well a particular monetary rule works under a range of assumptions
regarding the relationship between money and output. By robust, I mean the extent to which rules
continue to perform effectively under less than ideal conditions regarding monetary policymakers
knowledge and incentives (Leeson & Subrick, 2006).
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the monetary authorities objectives, and Canzoneri & Gray (1985), who argue that
if the monetary authority has private information with respect to its objectives and
forecasts then establishing credibility with a monetary rule is much more difficult
than is commonly recognized. I extend these arguments by showing that even under
a targeting rule the monetary authority can exploit its instrument independence to
obscure its objectives from the public, thereby allowing it to use monetary policy for
political purposes.
I proceed as follows. The next section briefly sketches the case for monetary
rules, which establishes a benchmark against which the monetary and macroeconomic
effects of instrument independence can be assessed. In Section 3, I provide a brief
overview of the literature on the political economy of monetary policy in order to
illustrate the need to consider seriously the possibility that the monetary authority
may not always act in the public interest. Section 4 builds on this discussion by
presenting a monetary policy game wherein I relax the assumption of benevolence
on the part of the monetary authority, which I then use as the backdrop of the
simple model that I use to illustrate the monetary and macroeconomic consequences
of instrument independence in Section 5. The final section concludes.
2 The Reason of Monetary Rules
Broadly speaking, the overarching purpose of any monetary rule is to establish a
monetary order wherein the price system can function as effectively as possible,
i.e., to ensure that monetary policy does not alter the structure of relative prices
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and output (Buchanan, 1962). To accomplish this goal, the public must be able
to predict with reasonable certainty the future path of the price level, the primary
determinant of which is the nature of the monetary system (Leijonhufvud, 1987). For
instance, under a discretionary regime there will likely be more uncertainty about the
behavior of the price level, whereas under a rules-based one the opposite will be the
case - assuming that the monetary authority’s commitment to the rule is credible,
of course.
There are several factors that prevent a discretionary regime from establishing the
type of monetary order described in the previous paragraph. The first is that such
regimes are dynamically inconsistent (Barro & Gordon, 1983; Calvo, 1978; Kydland
& Prescott, 1977).4 Even when the monetary authority acts in the public interest
and the public is fully informed about the authority’s objectives, the lack of a credi-
ble commitment to the monetary authority’s announced policy leads to sub-optimal
outcomes. Once the authority announces the future path of the price level and the
public have set their expectations, the monetary authority will be tempted to deviate
from the announced policy to reduce current unemployment. The public, however,
are aware of this temptation, and, wanting to avoid the costs of unanticipated infla-
tion, update their expectations accordingly. In equilibrium, on the vertical long-run
Phillips Curve, the chosen inflation rate is higher without an offsetting reduction in
unemployment. This outcome is unambiguously inferior to that where the monetary
authority can credibly commit to zero inflation.
The second factor is that counter-cyclical policy may actually destabilize the
4See McCallum (1995) for a criticism of this literature.
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economy. For instance, if the economy returns to its long-run equilibrium faster
than the monetary authority can recognize and respond to shocks, then stabilization
policy may actually have a destabilizing effect. These “long and variable lags” as
Milton Friedman (1961) called them, mean that even well-meaning policymakers
may be unable to exercise discretion in a manner that ensures that the economy is
as close as possible to its natural rate of output.5 The source of this problem is that
the monetary authority lacks the knowledge necessary to implement well-timed and
appropriately-sized monetary stimulus (Salter & Smith, 2017). While it is possible
that discretionary monetary policy could be effective in a world wherein policymakers
had perfect knowledge, the fact such a world does not exist makes adherence to a
monetary rule the second best alternative (Lipsey & Lancaster, 1956).
Thus far, the underlying assumption regarding the monetary authority’s objective
is that it acts to further the public interest but is unsuccessful because it cannot
credibly commit to its announced policy or because it lacks the requisite knowledge to
implement effective counter-cyclical policies. Note that if this were the extent of the
problems facing a discretionary regime, and if the monetary authority always acted in
the public interest, then it would be entirely appropriate for the comparative analysis
of alternative monetary rules to focus exclusively on their technical operation. As
long as the chosen rule was credible and did not place unrealistic knowledge burdens
on monetary policymakers then it would effectively address the issues I discussed in
the previous paragraphs.6
5Meltzer (1987) makes a related point regarding the accuracy of macroeconomic forecasts,
which, he argues, are themselves influenced by the uncertainty created by a discretionary regime.
See also: Orphanides (2003).
6See Orphanides (2001) for a discussion about the importance of considering the knowledge
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As it happens, however, there is a substantial body of work indicating that central
banks are both subject to external political pressure and pursue their own interests
at the expense of the public’s. This factor I argue, has been largely ignored in the
literature on monetary rules.7 In the next section, I briefly survey the literature on
the political economy of monetary policy to emphasize the importance of taking this
factor seriously when considering alternative institutional arrangements.
3 The Politics of Monetary Policy
Economists do not generally regarding the realism of their assumptions about the
underlying motivations of actors in their models as being particularly important
(Friedman, 1953). Nonetheless, assuming that monetary policymakers act in a way
inconsistent with the public interest remains controversial. Accordingly, it will be
useful to briefly survey the literature on the political economy of monetary policy in
order to justify my argument that the comparative analysis of alternative monetary
rules should be done under the assumption that monetary policymakers may not
always act in the public interest.
A note of caution is in order, however. I am not claiming that monetary policy-
makers are any more-or-less self-interested than their private sector counterparts.8
Instead, I am assuming that monetary policymakers are no different than everyone
burdens that monetary policy rules place on the monetary authority.
7There are, of course, exceptions. See Selgin (2016), for example.
8See Salter & Luther (2019) for a discussion on this point. They extend Alchian’s (1950)
“evolutionary” approach to the selection of monetary policymakers, noting that the institution of
central banking selects individuals with certain characteristics that are conducive to the institutional
environment. See also: Salter & Smith (2019).
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else, i.e., they are self-interested. The assumption of behavioral symmetry across
private and public spheres shifts the analytical focus away from policymakers’ moti-
vations, which cannot be subjected to empirical verification, and refocuses it on the
constraints generated by the institutional context.
Monetary policy is made within a complex network of overlapping institutional
environments, each exerting influence on monetary policymakers and elected officials
(Kane, 1982; Meltzer, 2011; Poole, 1987). Hetzel (1984, 1990), for example, argues
that the overall stance of monetary policy must be consistent with the current state of
the economy, otherwise monetary policymakers will face backlash from the political
system. In consequence, monetary policymakers resist committing to a specific policy
in order to ensure that they can respond appropriately to an ever-changing political
environment, which can lead to political business cycles (MacRae, 1977; Nordhaus,
1975).
There are essentially two distinct channels through which the political system
can influence monetary policy in the United States. The first is via the executive
branch. Chappell et al. (1993), for instance, argue that the President influences
monetary policy primarily through his authority to appoint members to the Board
of Governors.9 Other studies - such as Abrams (2006), Auerbach (1985), and Smith
& Boettke (2015) - argue that the President can influence monetary policy by directly
pressuring the Chairperson of the Board of Governors. Regardless of the exact
mechanism, empirical studies have found support for the conjecture that monetary
policy responds to the President’s wishes (Grier, 1987, 1989; Weintraub, 1978).
9See also: Kane (1988) and Puckett (1984).
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The second channel through which the political system can influence monetary
policy is pressure from the legislature. The Federal Reserve owes its existence to
Congress, which is well-situated to pressure monetary policymakers (Binder & Spin-
del, 2017). Consistent with the congressional dominance approach to politics (Wein-
gast & Moran, 1983), several studies have found evidence suggesting that Congress
takes an active role in monetary policy (Grier, 1991; Hess & Shelton, 2016). That
Congress would do so is unsurprising given the effect that monetary policy can have
on elected officials’ constituents (Kane, 1980).10
Of course, neither the President or Congress can monitor the behavior of the
Federal Reserve at zero cost, which creates a potential principal-agent problem of
the sort described by Niskanen (1968). Unlike normal bureaucracies, however, the
Federal Reserve does not rely on Congress for its budget. Instead, the Fed earns
income on the assets it owns, which it turns over to the Treasury after covering
its operating expenses. M. Toma (1982) argues that this arrangement creates an
inflationary bias in the Fed’s monetary policy because it can increase the size of
its budget by selecting a production function that is inconsistent with the least-cost
method of producing base money - a conjecture for which Shughart & Tollison (1983)
provide additional evidence.11
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that these findings are not uncontrover-
sial. Nor do they demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that monetary policymak-
ers are incapable of acting in the public interest. What this evidence does suggest,
10See Anderson et al. (1988), Blau (2017), Blau et al. (2013), and Skaggs & Wasserkrug (1983)
for examples of the link between interest groups, Congress, and the Federal Reserve.
11See Timberlake (1985) and E. F. Toma & Toma (1985) for additional evidence of the bureau-
cratic hypothesis of the Fed’s behavior.
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however, is that consideration must be given to the political economy of monetary
policy when designing monetary institutions intended to serve the public interest.12
To be effective, therefore, a monetary rule must account for the type of behavior
described in this section; otherwise, there is no guarantee that it will be able to
effectively a predictable monetary and macroeconomic regime.
4 A Monetary Policy Game Without Romance
Consider the following monetary policy game between the public and the monetary
authority.13 In this game, deviations of output and employment from their natural
rates are positively related to unanticipated money growth. In addition, the mon-
etary regime is one in which the monetary authority possesses unlimited discretion
over the conduct of monetary policy, both in terms of setting the policy goal and the
instruments used to achieve it.
To be consistent with the political economy literature discussed in the previous
section, I assume that the monetary authority has a state-dependent objective. At
any given point in time, the state of the this objective reflects the current political
equilibrium, which emerges via competition among various interest groups (including
the monetary authority itself). Some of these groups will favor economic stimulation
and others low inflation. I assume also that this equilibrium changes over time in
ways that the monetary authority cannot predict with certainty, though the equilib-
12Moreover, as Leeson (2006) demonstrates, if only a fraction of monetary policymakers are
benevolent, i.e., motivated by the public interest, then the dominant strategy may still be to cater
to special interest groups, which only strengthens the case for considering rules that are robust to
less than ideal behavioral assumptions regarding monetary policymakers’ motivations.
13See Cukierman & Meltzer (1986) for a formal version of the game discussed in this section.
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rium does exhibit some degree of persistence.14 Because the monetary authority’s
actions in the current period affect the public’s inflation expectations and perforce
the authority’s ability to influence output and employment in the future, it selects a
rate of money growth that accounts for this influence. If, for example, the authority
expects to place more importance on economic stimulation in the future, it will select
a lower rate of money growth in the present and vice versa.
I assume that the public’s objective is to avoid the costs associated with unan-
ticipated inflation, i.e., to form accurate inflation expectations. I assume also that
while the public is aware of the structure of the monetary authority’s objective, they
are unaware of its current state at any given point in time. The source of this asym-
metry is the monetary authority’s proximity to the political process; simply put,
the monetary authority will be better informed about the various political pressures
impinging on it than will the public. That said, because the political equilibrium
exhibits some degree of persistence, the public can gradually detect changes in the
monetary authority’s objective by observing the past behavior of the money supply.
However, the information asymmetry between the two means that the monetary au-
thority will be able to influence output and employment in the short run through
unexpected money growth.
This information asymmetry is complicated by the monetary authority’s lack of
complete control over the money supply, which interferes with the public’s ability to
14By persistence, I mean the extent to which the current equilibrium influences subsequent
periods. For instance, let the equilibrium in the current period be given by: zt = ρzt−1 + εt, where
0 < ρ < 1 and εt v N(0, σ2ε ). Here, ρ measures the persistence of the political equilibrium and εt
captures the uncertainty faced by the monetary authority with respect to the state of its objective.
As ρ increases, so too does the persistence of the political equilibrium. On the other hand, as σ2ε
increases the political environment becomes increasingly unstable.
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infer the authority’s objective. In consequence, the public face a signal extraction
problem: does an unanticipated change in growth rate of the money supply reflect a
change in the monetary authority’s objective or is it due to a control error? In order
for the behavior of the money supply to convey meaningful information the public
must disentangle the effects of control errors from actual changes in the monetary
authority’s objective. Accordingly, the public rationally attribute only a fraction of
the fluctuation in the growth rate of the money supply to a shift in the monetary
authority’s objective while attributing the rest to the possibility of a control error.
The public’s expectations regarding the growth rate of the money supply in the
current period will reflect the actual growth rate that obtained in the previous period
and their expectations thereof. All else equal, as the variance of the control errors
increases the public will assign more weight to their expectations and less to the
actual behavior of the money supply. The intuition here is straight forward: the
noisier the signal becomes the less meaningful is the information it conveys, i.e., the
more likely it is that unanticipated money growth was caused by a transitory control
error rather than a change in the monetary authority’s objective.
Since the political equilibrium can shift randomly over time the monetary author-
ity’s objective in one period may differ from that in previous periods. However, due
to the authority’s superior knowledge of the prevailing political equilibrium the pub-
lic will only detect such changes gradually. The speed with which they will become
aware of a change in the monetary authority’s objective is negatively related to the
variance of the control errors; the more tightly the monetary authority controls the
money supply, the quicker the public is able to recognize a change in the authority’s
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objectives, all else equal.
Recall that in this game the monetary authority has complete discretion over
both the monetary policy goal as well as the instruments it can use to achieve it.
Under this assumption, the variance of the control errors, and thus the speed with
which the public can detect a change in the political equilibrium can be influenced
by the monetary authority. By intentionally choosing noisier policy instruments the
monetary authority can increase the length of time it takes for the public to recognize
a change in its objective. Doing so increases the authority’s control over the timing
of monetary surprises, thereby enabling it to respond appropriately to changes in the
political equilibrium.
Whether the monetary authority selects noisier instruments will depend on its de-
gree of time preference and the stability of the political environment. If the monetary
authority heavily discounts the future then it will opt for noisier controls. Likewise,
as the political environment becomes less stable the public will place more weight
on the behavior of the money supply in the previous period when forming their ex-
pectations. The monetary authority can counterbalance the public’s focus on the
recent behavior of the money supply by adopting control procedures that increase
the variability of the growth rate of the money supply thereby increasing the amount
of time it takes for the public to recognize a change in the state of the authority’s
objective.
In equilibrium, the monetary authority chooses the current and future rates of
monetary expansion that maximize the expected value of its objective. This decision
will reflect the monetary authority’s prediction of its own future objectives as well as
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the effect that its actions will have on the public’s expectations and thus its ability to
influence output and employment in subsequent periods. In addition, the monetary
authority will select policy instruments that provide it with the desired degree of
ambiguity. The public, on the other hand, will form their expectations by observing
past rates of money growth, which they then use to infer the state of the monetary
authority’s objective. The equilibrium in this case is self-fulfilling; both the monetary
authority and the public have selected the best strategies given each others’ actions.
Whether this game is an accurate description of the environment within which
monetary policy is made can certainly be debated. However, it serves as a useful
framework for assessing how robust a monetary rule is with respect to assumptions
about the monetary authority’s objectives. For instance, it suggests that a targeting
rule with instrument independence may not be sufficient to insulate monetary policy
from political influence. In the next section, I examine this issue in further detail
from the perspective of monetary equilibrium.
5 The Effect of Alternative Policy Instruments on
Monetary Equilibrium
In the previous section, I described a monetary policy game between the monetary
authority and the public wherein the monetary authority, in an effort to obscure its
objective from the public, intentionally selects policy instruments that increase the
amount of noise in the money supply process, which prevents the public from ascer-
taining the current state of the authority’s objective. In consequence, the monetary
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authority can respond to political pressure to influence output and employment in
the short run.
In this section, I model the effects of alternative policy instruments on output
and prices using a monetary equilibrium framework. I demonstrate that only under
a highly restrictive set of assumptions will the variability of macroeconomic variables
be invariant to the choice of control procedure. What this analysis suggests is that
while a benevolent monetary authority would always select the control procedure
that minimized the variance of the money supply process, an opportunistic authority
may not. In consequence, a monetary rule that allows the monetary authority to
retain independence over the instruments of monetary policy may undermine its own
purpose.
5.1 Monetary Equilibrium
To being with, I assume that the demand for nominal money balances is a function
of nominal income:
Md = kPY (1)
where k ∈ [0, 1] and represents desired fluidity - the fraction of nominal income that
people wish to hold in the form of nominal money balances - with P denoting the
price level and Y real output.15
Even under a central banking regime, the monetary authority does not control the
15Desired fluidity is a function of several factors including the level of income and the returns
on various assets such as money and bonds. In equilibrium, the return on the various forms of
wealth must be equal at the margin. See Friedman (1956) for an in-depth discussion of the factors
influencing the demand for money.
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supply of money directly. Instead, it adjusts the various instruments at its disposal,
e.g., high-powered money or a short-term interest rate, to influence the total quantity
of money in the economy. Leaving aside for now how it is that the monetary authority
influences the quantity of money in the economy, I assume simply that the money
supply can be expressed as:
M s = M (2)
Money equilibrium requires that (1) and (2) be equal:
M = kPY (3)
When this condition is met, people’s actual money balances will equal the quantity
demanded at the prevailing price level. More importantly, in equilibrium, money will
be neutral in the sense that it will not affect the structure of relative prices and thus
will not have an effect on real variables such as output and employment.
The goal of most monetary policy rules is to ensure that the monetary authority
adjusts M in a manner consistent with preserving monetary equilibrium. An increase
in desired fluidity unmet by an increase in the money supply means that the price
level needs to adjust to restore equilibrium. The issue, however, is that because
prices cannot adjust instantaneously an increase in desired fluidity will cause output
to fall in the short run as people attempt to build up their money balances (Yeager,
1956).16 This costly adjustment process can be avoided if the monetary authority
responds with appropriately-sized and correctly-timed monetary stimulus.
16There is a substantial literature on the causes of short-run price stickiness. See, for example,
Alchian (1969), Fischer (1977), and Lucas (1972).
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Recall that the monetary authority does not have direct control over the money
supply. This fact can make the aforementioned stimulus difficult to implement in
practice. Moreover, as I argue in the paragraphs that follow the degree of control
that the monetary authority has over the money supply process is not invariant
to the policy instrument. In consequence, a rule-bound central bank may still be
able to respond to political pressure for economic stimulation by opting for control
procedures that not necessarily the most “efficient” in the sense of being able to
produce a certain quantity of money with the lowest amount of variance in the
process of doing so.
5.2 Alternative Policy Instruments
I now turn to the issue of maintaining monetary equilibrium under different assump-
tions about the monetary authority’s policy instruments. Throughout this section,
I assume that a monetary policy rule is in place. I do not specify which type of
rule, other than assuming that the rule requires the monetary authority to target
a nominal variable such as the inflation rate or the growth rate of nominal gross
domestic product. I assume also that the monetary authority retains instrument
independence.
I will consider the effects of two different control procedures: the quantity of
high-powered money and a short-term interest rate like the federal funds rate. To
do so, it will be helpful to adopt more specific money supply and demand equations
that are both dynamic and reflect the possibility of stochastic disturbances. I assume
that the money demand and supply functions take the following form:
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mt = pt + a0 + a1yt − a2Rt + εt (4)
mt = b0 + b1ht + b2Rt + ζt (5)
where lower-case variables denote the natural logarithm, e.g., mt = ln(Mt), and
the subscript t reflects that variables value in the current period. The variable Rt
denotes the level of the nominal interest rate such that the parameters a2 and b2
reflect the semi-elasticity of both money demand and supply with respect to the
nominal interest rate, and the variable ht is the natural logarithm of high-powered
money. Next, I assume that all of the parameters are positive. Finally, I assume
that the disturbances εt and ζt are random, i.e., that in each period εt v N(0, σ2ε )
and ζt v N(0, σ2ζ ), and serially independent.
5.2.1 Money Stock Control and High-Powered Money
I begin with the case where the monetary authority uses the quantity of high-powered
money as its policy instrument. Here, the authority uses the supply and demand
relations expressed by (4) and (5) to determine the quantity of reserves consistent
with producing a quantity of money, denoted as m∗t , required by the monetary rule




t + a0 + a1y
e
t − a2Rt (6)
m∗t = b0 + b1ht + b2Rt (7)
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where the superscript e denotes the monetary authority’s forecast at t − 1 of that
variable’s expected value at t.17 Eliminating the nominal interest rate and solving
the (6) and (7) indicates that the monetary should set the quantity of high-powered




t − b2(pet + a1yet )− (a0b2 + a2b0)
a2b1
(8)
However, in any given period, the stochastic disturbances can differ from their
expected values, and the same is true for output and prices. Thus, in order to deter-
mine the quantity of money that will actually exist in period t, it will be necessary to
solve (4) and (5) for mt and then substitute (8) into the resulting function. Doing so





b2(pt − pet ) + a1b2(yt − yet ) + a2ζt + b2εt
a2 + b2
(9)
Subtracting m∗t from either side indicates that the control error associated with using
the quantity of high-powered money as the policy instrument will be:
mt −m∗t =
b2(pt − pet ) + a1b2(yt − yet ) + a2ζt + b2εt
a2 + b2
(10)
17While I do not consider the possibility here, the variance of the monetary authority’s forecast
errors are a choice variable from the authority’s perspective, to a certain extent. Using noisier
forecasts will also increase the variability of the money supply process, thereby preventing the
public from accurately detecting changes in the monetary authority’s objective.
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5.2.2 Money Stock Control and the Interest Rate
Alternatively, the monetary authority can use a short-term interest rate to influence
the public’s demand for money. In this case, because the authority is not trying
to target a specific quantity of money, it will only be necessary to analyze the rela-
tionship between the demand for money and the interest rate. Here, the monetary
authority will simply select a value for Rt that will produce a quantity of money
demanded consistent with the target stipulated by the monetary rule based on its
expectations regarding output, prices, and the element of randomness associated
with the demand for money. Formally, this procedure can be expressed as:
m∗t = p
e
t + a0 + a1y
e
t − a2Rt (11)
Identifying the control error is a straightforward exercise: simply subtract (11) from
(4):
mt −m∗t = pt − pet + a1(yt − yet ) + εt (12)
5.2.3 Comparing Policy Instruments
Recall that in the monetary policy game with the opportunistic monetary authority
that it may opt for policy instruments that introduce more noise into the money
supply process, thereby preventing the public from ascertaining the current state of
the authority’s objective. Here, I compare the variances of the two control procedures
discussed in the previous paragraphs and show that only under a highly restrictive
set of assumptions about the model’s parameters will the variance of the money
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supply be invariant to the choice of policy instrument.
To determine and compare the variance of the control errors associated with
either policy instrument, it will be helpful to define the following composite variable:
zt = pt − pet + a1(yt − yet ) + εt (13)





mt −m∗t = zt (15)
It follow from (14) and (15) that the variance of the control error using high-powered










and the variance of the control error using the interest rate as the instrument will
be: σ2z .
Thus, the money supply process will be invariant to the choice of policy instru-










When the variance of the money supply disturbance is less than or equal to the
variance of the composite variable zt, the variance of the money supply process will
be less under the use of high-powered money as the instrument and vice versa.
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5.3 Discussion
The point of the preceding analysis is not to argue in favor of one instrument over
another. Instead, what this simple model illustrates is that a targeting rule that
leaves the monetary authority free to select whichever operating procedures it desires
may allow the authority to retain more discretion than is commonly recognized. This
discretion is not necessarily a problem as long as the monetary authority’s objectives
are consistent with the public interest; in this case, there would be little value in
opting for noisier control procedures. On the other hand, if the monetary authority’s
objectives are inconsistent with the public interest, then a monetary rule that allows
the authority to select the policy instruments may create a space for the sort of
opportunistic behavior rules-based regimes are intended to prevent, namely using
monetary policy for political purposes.
Two examples illustrate this point. First, the amount of seigniorage revenue the
government can collect is inversely related to the speed with which people update
their inflation expectations. Thus, the more imperfect is the monetary authority’s
control over the money supply, the greater the amount of seigniorage the authority
can collect for a given rate of monetary expansion. Second, the extent to which
monetary policy can influence real variables such as output and employment again
depends on the speed with which the public adjust their inflation expectations. By
adopting noisier control procedures, the monetary authority can have a greater in-
fluence on real variables for a given amount of money growth. Of course, a targeting
rule (assuming that its enforced) limits the extent to which the monetary authority













Figure 1: Monetary Equilibrium, Output, and Prices
In addition to opening the door to the politicization of monetary policy, such
an arrangement also introduces the possibility of monetary and macroeconomic in-
stability. Consider the simple model illustrated in Figure 1. The panel on the left
shows the supply and demand for money balances and the panel on the right shows
aggregate demand and supply. As the monetary authority’s control over the money
supply decreases the distribution of potential monetary equilibria increases, illus-
trated by the distance between the money supply curve and the randomness bands
that flank it. As can easily be seen in Figure 1, as this distances increases, deviations
of output and employment from their natural rates will increase as will uncertainty
with respect to the price level.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has taken a “politics without romance” approach to determine how much
independence is consistent with a rules-based regime. I have shown that when a
monetary rule is under-specified, there are other margins of adjustment that the
monetary authority can exploit. For instance, a monetary authority that retains
instrument independence under a targeting rule may still be able to influence mon-
etary policy for political purposes, potentially contributing to monetary instability.
This analysis suggests that advocates of monetary rules need to consider seriously
the extent to which the monetary authority should be free to select its own operating
procedures.
The implications of my analysis are not limited to the operating procedures con-
sidered here. For instance, the Federal Reserve has, and will likely continue to lobby
Congress for changes in the set of permissible control procedures.18 Some economists
have criticized the Fed’s recent policy of paying interest on excess reserves on the
grounds that it has the potential to subject monetary policy to the vagaries of poli-
tics (Jordan & Luther, n.d.; Selgin, 2018). The analysis of such changes should not
be limited to the technical merits of allowing the Federal Reserve to use this-or-that
instrument. Instead, political economists should consider whether the instruments
under discussion could be exploited in a manner that is inconsistent with the over-
arching goal of establishing a rules-based regime.
While the analysis in this paper suggests that instrument independence may be
18M. Toma (1982), for example, has argued that the Federal Reserve has lobbied for statutory
changes to its operating regime that are consistent with increasing its revenue.
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incompatible with the objectives of a rules-based regime, a few words of caution are
in order. First, establishing a rules-based framework that stipulates both the target
of monetary policy as well as the set of permissible instruments that can be used to
achieve that target also has costs that should be considered. For instance, committing
the monetary authority to a particular policy instrument may mean foregoing the
use of superior instruments in particular circumstances. Moreover, it will likely be
difficult, if not impossible to know ex ante which instrument will be better suited
to ensuring monetary stability.19 In short, some amount of independence may be
optimal, even under less than ideal conditions, because the costs of eliminating its
deleterious effects are less than the benefits.
If the rules-based framework does stipulate the operating procedure, then there is
additional factor that must be considered, namely that of addressing how to amend
the set of approved policy instruments in the event that a superior one emerges. It
would seem naive to assume that leaving this to the political process will produce
results consistent with the overarching goal of a rules-based framework. Moreover,
the amendment process needs to be sufficiently difficult to ensure that changes are
not done to address a particular macroeconomic episode. How to implement this
idea in a manner that does not undermine the raison d’être of a monetary rule needs
to be considered in future work on this important topic.
On the other hand, the analysis in this paper also points to the consideration of
more radical monetary alternatives, like free banking. The exploitable margins of
19A confounding factor here is that the parameter estimates necessary to compare the perfor-
mance of alternative control procedures are not invariant to the choice of procedures themselves
(Lucas, 1976). In consequence, it is not clear whether empirical research will be capable of answering
questions about the efficacy of different policy instruments.
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adjustment may be too difficult to predict and thus the problems associated with
crafting a rules-based may be too great to justify such an arrangement. As Steve
Horwitz (2011) has argued, a rules-based regime may be unnecessary. Instead, mon-
etary stability may only require a system of contracts, private property, and the rule
of law.
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